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    With the lack of supervision, how stakeholders induce the unethical behavior of
security analysts has attracted the attention of scholars. At present, insurance
capital‘s the frequent turnover has a significant negative impact to the stability of
stock market, inducing the scold of "barbarians" and "vermin" by the regulators.
But how frequently increase or decrease on share holding by insurance capital
influences analysts' independence is relatively opaque, and its mechanism needs
further mining.
   Based on the information asymmetry theory, principal-agent theory and
behavioral finance theory, this paper selects domestic listed companies in the first
three quarters of 2012-2016 as the research sample, using Lang and Landholm
(1996)’s method to construct the regression model and analyst forecast deviation
index to explore the influence of insurance capital’s increase or decrease of share
holding on the behavior of analysts’ following and analysts’ forecast deviation,
while controlling the company's financial risk, the level of information disclosure
and earnings predictabilities. The results shows that listed companies in the
current insurance capital will cause analysts to give more follow-up, and
insurance capital’s increasing holding of listed companies has no significant
impact on analysts' earnings forecasts, but the insurance capital’s decreasing
holdings of listed companies will lead to a more optimistic earnings forecast by
analysts.
   There are two innovations in this paper. First, the influence of institutional
ownership on analysts' independence in foreign countries has a lot of research
results. However, the sample selected in these research are mostly in Europe
countries, where the institutional environment of Europe countries is quite
different from that of China. In this paper, based on the domestic environment, the













regulatory reform. Second, the academic research on the economic
consequences of the increase and decrease of the insurance capital’s holding is
mainly based on the theoretical analysis, lacking of empirical research results,
this paper helps to fill this gap.
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